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Abstract 
China has rapidly transformed itself using dynamic reforms through economic transition and regulatory provisions. 
Consequently, certain firms have undertaken mergers and acquisitions (M&A) to achieve higher market capitalization. 
However, the extent to which such reforms have affected the Chinese consumer product and services sector largely 
remains unexplored, particularly compared to a more seasoned market, such as the UK. This study examines a panel of 
recent M&A events in the consumer product and services market of both China and the UK and evaluates the event-
induced wealth gain to the acquirers. The authors’ results suggest that the UK acquirers’ exhibit a relatively higher 
return continuation than do their Chinese counterparts. In addition, in contrast to the UK market, the post-event returns 
for the Chinese market are significantly negative, except for the announcement date. The findings demonstrate that the 
Chinese consumer market does not respond to M&A announcements to the same extent as does the UK market. 
Finally, the shareholders wealth gain, as one of the prime motives of M&A, is not duly achieved for the Chinese 
acquirers, despite the wider reform of the Chinese market. 
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Introduction© 
Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) realign and 
restructure the operational, strategic and financial 
portfolio of firms. In the UK, M&A activities have 
spanned over four decades, whereas M&A activities 
in China are a relatively recent phenomena. China 
has made significant strides in making Chinese 
firms more competitive in both the domestic and 
global markets after joining the World Trade 
Organization in 2001 (Li-Ying and Wang, 2014), 
with the first formal case of M&A in China 
registered in July 1984 (Xu, 2008). Subsequently, 
M&A activities in China have rapidly expanded due 
to its transitioning from a planned to a market 
economy from 1984 to 1992 (Cai, 2007). During 
this period, several state-owned enterprises were 
also incurring losses. For example, during the 
1990s, the Big Four state-owned banks accumulated 
large portions of non-performing loans (NPLs) 
(Barth et al., 2009)1. In addition, The National 
Bureau of Statistics of China reported that the 
Chinese industrial production, in January of 1990, 
registered a record low average of -21.10%. To 
counter-balance such constraints, the Chinese 
government instigated several reform measures 
allowing M&A activities. However, most events 
subsequently failed because the majority were fully 
controlled by the government. The government 
                                                     
© Yinuo Zhao, Rama Prasad Kanungo, Yusuf Karbhari, 2015. 
Yinuo Zhao, China. 
Rama Prasad Kanungo, Dr., Newcastle University, UK. 
Yusuf Karbhari, Cardiff Business School, UK. 
1 The Big Four refers to the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China 
(ICBC), the Agricultural Bank of China (ABC), the Bank of China 
(BOC), and the China Construction Bank (CCB). In 2007, the China 
Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) began including the Bank of 
Communications (BOCOM), the fifth largest bank, among state-owned 
commercial banks (SOCBs) in their statistical reports. 
ignored the development required and failed to 
understand the characteristics of M&A (Cai, 2007). 
Therefore, this paper investigates the wealth gain of 
both the UK and Chinese acquirers specifically 
engaged in M&A events in the consumer product 
and services sector. Primarily, this study 
investigates whether the UK acquirers gain 
differently from their Chinese counterparts, and if 
so, what is the market rationale behind such a 
difference? Several unique characteristics of the 
Chinese consumer and product services market have 
motivated this study. For instance, the government 
recently reduced the interest rate and capital 
reserve, thereby facilitating higher lending and 
enhancing consumer purchasing power and capital 
flow. In addition, China’s lending indices are 
growing with stronger consumer confidence. 
Therefore, the Chinese market is emerging from the 
lagged effect of state enterprise towards a more 
efficient market. Furthermore, the government is 
offering fiscal stimuli to decelerate sharp inflation 
in addition to offering lucrative tax cuts. A survey 
of the consumer market undertaken by Deloitte 
suggests that the Chinese consumer market growth 
measured by its Q ratio of 1.49 is higher in 
comparison to most European makets2. This clearly 
reflects the upward trend of the Chinese consumer 
market. Recently, China also liberalized its M&A 
                                                     
2 In 2013, the Q ratio was calculated for 190 publicly traded consumer 
product companies, compared with 189 companies in 2012 and 186 the 
previous year. The composite Q ratio (calculated by taking the sum of 
all companies’ market capitalization and dividing by the sum of all 
companies’ asset values) is 1.327, which is considerably higher than in 
recent years. Last year, the composite Q ratio was 1.200 compared with 
1.205 the year before, and 1.068 and 0.800 in the two prior years, 
respectively. Given the recovery in the global economy and the increase 
in equity prices in many markets, it is no surprise that the composite Q 
ratio has increased. (Global Powers of Consumer Products 2013 
Engaging the connected consumer, Deloitte). 
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policy by introducing innovations such as preferred 
share options in its merger funding provisions. In 
addition, the Securities Regulatory Commission’s 
(CSRC) encouraged reform in the M&A regulations 
by making them more market-oriented1. 
This paper is organized into 4 sections. Section 1 
reviews the extant literature with a focus on studies 
undertaken in China and the UK. Section 2 presents 
the data and describes the methodology used 
including the model specification. Section 3 reports 
the empirical results, and the Final Section presents 
a summary and conclusions.  
1. Literature review: evidence from the UK 
and Chinese M&As 
A growing trend suggests that the per dollar value 
of M&A is increasing substantially. Typically, a 
successful M&A anticipates more remitted profits. 
The merged entity achieves an increased market 
share leading to improved ownership, leverage and 
capital structure of a firm (Ross, 2008; and 
Maksimovic and Prabala, 2011). Between 1992 and 
2000, the Chinese government gradually facilitated 
an enterprise driven market while reforming to a 
market economy. Subsequently, firms increasingly 
engaged in M&A activities from technology, 
management, as well as capital and resource 
allocation aspects (Chen, 2007). In fact, all forms of 
horizontal M&A, vertical M&A, and diversified 
M&A have been experienced in the Chinese capital 
market. Moreover, since China entered the WTO, 
i.e., the post-2000 period, China’s economy has 
embraced a wider scope of globalization with M&A 
activities being rapidly expanded by following 
international practices. Liu and Huang (2013) report 
that, between 2000 and 2010, the total number of 
M&A transactions in China was 14,127 and worth 
approximately $913,471 million dollars.  
In reality, prior studies largely differ on whether 
M&A creates value (Bruner, 2002). There are 
numerous studies relating to the short-term wealth 
effects of M&A in the UK; however, the evidence 
on the stock performance of acquiring companies is 
moderately mixed. For instance, Draper and 
Paudyal (1999) find that shareholders of target 
companies benefit from the announcement of 
acquisitions over the period surrounding the 
announcement. In contrast, the shareholders of the 
acquiring company suffer a loss. However, the loss 
suffered was reported to be less than 1% (Frank & 
Sam, 2004). Supporting evidence is also presented 
by Mulherin & Boone (2000) and Kuiper et al. 
(2003), who reported negative returns of -0.37% 
and -0.92%, respectively. 
                                                     
1 http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/12/12/uk-china-maidUKBRE9BB03B 
20131212. 
Conversely, Kennedy and Limmack (1996) report 
large excess returns for target companies; however, 
there are no significant excess returns, either 
positive or negative, to shareholders of the 
acquirers. Furthermore, Dickerson et al. (1997) find 
that domestic M&A in the UK leads to substantial 
returns accruing to shareholders in a target company 
with minimal or no positive profits for the 
shareholders of the acquiring company. In contrast, 
Fuller et al. (2002) claim that shareholders in 
acquiring companies experience positive abnormal 
returns when the target is a private company, but 
experience losses when purchasing a public 
company. Dai (2012) studied the influences of an 
M&A announcement on the security prices of 
bidding companies in mainland China and Hong 
Kong from 2000 to 2010. This research shows that 
both average abnormal returns and cumulative 
abnormal returns to mainland acquirers are positive, 
whereas the average abnormal return on the 
announced day is positive, and the cumulative 
abnormal return during the event window is 
negative in Hong Kong.  
Interestingly, Li and Chen (2002) examined the 
wealth effects of 349 M&A events from 1999 to 
2000 using an event study methodology in Shanghai 
and Shenzhen. The researchers find that M&A 
activities can increase the value of shareholders in 
acquiring firms; however, there is no significant 
effect on the wealth of shareholders in target 
companies. In addition, Li and Chen (2002) 
emphasize that various types of M&A have 
differential wealth effects. Shareholders from 
bidding firms with a large proportion of state shares 
or legal person shares can obtain significant 
increases of wealth. However, the types of 
ownership structure have no prominent influence on 
the shareholders’ wealth in target companies.   
Conversely, Zhang (2003) studied 1216 cases of 
M&A listed companies from 1993 to 2002 in China. 
The researcher concluded that the shareholders of 
target firms receive premiums to a maximum of 
29.05%; therefore, M&A activities create value for 
the target company. However, there is a negative 
impact on the shareholders of acquiring companies, 
whose stock price premium decline -16.7%. 
Similarly, Ruback (1982) Magenheim and Muller 
(1988) and Franks et al. (1991) find negative 
abnormal returns following restructuring for the 
USA firms; Jensen (1986, 1988) reports negative 
abnormal returns over several years following the 
completion of takeovers in the UK and USA. 
Furthermore, Ren (2006) uses 30 cases of M&A 
events undertaken during 2002 in listed Chinese 
manufacturing companies. The results show the 
performance level of sample companies in the same 
year as the M&A announcement is lower than that 
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in the year before M&A; therefore, M&A events 
provide a certain negative influence on the earnings 
per share of bidding firms. However, M&A 
performance improved after a few years of M&A. 
Similarly, Wang (2007), using 11 listed companies, 
finds that, after the first year of M&A, the 
performance of listed companies barely improves, a 
portion actually declines to an extent. However, as 
time passes, because of the strength of certain 
acquiring firms, the efficiency of resource 
integration improves, such that corporate 
performance basically remains stable or slightly 
increases. However, Zhang (2008) analyzes 55 
cases of foreign capital M&A activities among 
Chinese listed companies from 1995 to 2006, and 
finds that M&A events significantly improve the 
performance of listed companies and provides 
continuity. Thompson, Wright and Robbie (1989), 
studying UK MBOs, reported receivership of cash 
flow from parent companies, providing evidence in 
favor of the agency theory. 
Moreover, Li (2008) finds foreign capital M&A 
create shareholder wealth in Chinese listed 
companies. In particular, the degree of connection 
between the target companies and government 
suggests a positive wealth creation for the acquirer. 
Han and Jia (2009) further observed that the foreign 
capital M&A activities are not successful because 
they do not improve the performance of listed 
companies in China because different values, 
corporate cultures and management patterns 
collectively affect foreign capital M&A. By 
analyzing the M&A events of 67 listed companies 
in Shanghai and Shenzhen in 1998 in terms of 
return on equity and profit margins, Zhu and Wang 
(2002) believe that companies with poor 
performance are more willing to sell shares than 
those with strong performance. In addition, most 
M&A activities are strategic and targeted to 
improve business performance following mergers. 
In addition, the effect of cash acquisitions, as well 
as market-oriented acquisitions, is better from the 
perspective of target firms. Chen and Zhang (1999) 
use an event study based on the change of share 
price to analyze the M&A effects. As a result of an 
emerging Chinese capital market, investors attempt 
to speculate and seek short-term interests through 
M&A events instead of concentrating on long-term 
returns. Chen and Zhang (1999) regard 95 asset 
restructuring companies in Shanghai in 1997 as 
samples and conclude that the market does react 
to asset restructuring to an extent, with different 
types of restructuring having different market 
reflections. The share prices referring to a 
company’s equity transfer, asset stripping, and 
asset replacement first increase before the M&A 
announcement and then decrease after the 
announcement; however, the firms’ stock prices 
do not fluctuate because of the high share prices 
and large scale of the companies. Furthermore, 
examining UK restructuring activities, Higson 
and Elliott (1998) did not find negative abnormal 
returns for the UK firms over a longer window. 
The researchers reported that there appears to be 
no evidence of significant abnormal post-takeover 
performance in an equal-weighted portfolio of 
UK acquisitions over the 1975-1990 period, 
although they have taken a measure against a 
multi-factor benchmark containing proxies for 
size, past returns and dividend yields. However, 
according to Sun and Wang (1999), the 
performance of companies greatly improves after 
reorganization. The researchers studied the same 
samples as used by Chen and Zhang’s (1999) to 
analyze the net profit growth rate, earnings per 
share and its growth rate, and net assets yield 
before and after the restructuring in 1998. The 
researchers’ results state that net profit, earnings 
per share and net assets yield, and the average 
growth rate of firms that refer to control transfer 
in the same year as the restructuring are all 
negative. Nevertheless, the income and net profit 
of restructuring companies utilizing M&A 
increase moderately. In addition, the 
performances of asset replacement firms improve 
significantly, whereas the performance of asset 
stripping companies’ declines.  
Andrade et al. (2001) document that the average 
three day abnormal returns for the target firms is 
16%, which subsequently increases to 24% over a 
longer event window. Studies conducted by 
Jensen and Ruback (1983), Jarrell, Brickley and 
Netter (1988) are consistent with Lubaktin 
(1987), who states that mergers create value for 
shareholders in general. However, Clark and Ofek 
(1994), after examining 38 takeovers of distressed 
firms using five different measures to evaluate 
the post-merger performance of the combined 
bidder and target firms, argue that all 
performance measures suggest that bidders are 
unable to successfully restructure targets to create 
value for shareholders. 
2. Data and methodology 
2.1. Data source and selection criteria. We 
construct a panel of data composed of 29 Chinese 
and 25 UK acquirers from 1 January 2012 to 31 
December 2012 within the consumer products and 
services sector in both countries. Our data were 
collected from Thomson One Banker and from 
Datastream. All the acquirers included in the 
dataset are public listed firms. We select a narrow 
window primarily to capture the latest market 
reaction in response to M&A announcements in 
the Chinese consumer products and services 
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sector and compare this to the UK. The UK is a 
more seasoned market than China and includes a 
substantial number of M&A activities while 
rapidly growing1. Therefore, the UK market 
appeared to be an ideal benchmark against an 
emerging economy such as China. Several recent 
changes in the Chinese consumer products and 
services industry are taking effect because the 
government introduced several liberal measures 
to reform the M&A provision to increase the 
efficiency of the consumer market. Because the 
changes are recent, a narrow window appears to 
be a rational choice to capture the announcement 
effect of M&A and its wealth effect on the 
acquirers. The Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) 
Composite Index and the Financial Times Stock 
Exchange 100 Index (FTSE 100) are used to 
proxy the market return of China and the UK, 
respectively. Both indices were obtained from 
Bloomberg.  
The initial data set is composed of 57 Chinese 
firms and 87 UK firms for the sample period 
under study. The sample resulted in 29 Chinese 
and 25 UK acquirers after setting the acquirer 
macro industry to the consumer products and 
services. The sample companies are all public 
listed companies that had successfully completed 
acquisition deals; however, the delisted and thinly 
traded companies are excluded from the final 
panel of data. Because Thomson One Banker does 
not contain a daily return for the companies, the 
stock prices were extracted from Datastream. 
Furthermore, the firms whose announcement 
dates are different from their effective dates were 
removed.  
2.2. Methodology: event study and model 
specification. Often, three models, (i.e., Single-
Index Model, the Market Model and the CAPM 
Model) are used in event studies. Compared with 
other models, the market model is more 
consistent and robust (Brown and Warner, 1985). 
Wong (2002) finds the event study methodology 
to be more accurate than accounting-based 
analysis, although it is not entirely free from 
certain limitations. For example, unavailable 
stock prices and market returns on the selected 
days throughout the estimation period 
(Sitthipongpanich, 2010) could affect the 
estimation specifications. 
                                                     
1 The “Mergermarket” reports that the M&A activity targeting the 
United Kingdom was £37.5bn in 2014. The second quarter of 2014 
witnessed a stark improvement compared with the previous quarter, 
with an increase of 156.5%, from £10.5bn to £27bn and represented the 
highest quarterly value in the country since Q2 2012. 
(http://www.mergermarket.com/pdf/MergermarketTrendReport.H1201
4.UK.pdf).  
We employ a market model for the estimation of 
announcement returns. The estimation window is 
stipulated from 300 trading days to 15 days prior 
to the announcement date (-300 days, -15 days). 
We set a 21 day event window surrounding the 
announcement date, i.e., (-10, 0, +10). Kothari 
and Warner (2004) indicate that the long-horizon 
results are problematic, whereas the short-horizon 
methods are relatively straightforward and 
trouble-free.  
The market model is written as follows: 
itmtmtiit RR εβα ++= ,                                    (1) 
where Rit = return on security i on day t, Rmt = return on market index on day t, εit = model error term of security i on day t with expected value 
equal to zero, ai = expected value of (Rit − Rmt), 
βmt = a covariance between Rit and Rmt divided by 
a variance of Rmt. 
The abnormal returns are equal to the actual 
returns minus the estimated nominal returns 
surrounding -10, 0, + 10 days of the 
announcement date. The difference of the two is 
the value of a firm during the event is as follows:  
)( mtiiitit RRAR βα +−= ,                                    (2) 
where ARit = abnormal return for firm i on t day, 
Rit = the actual daily rate of return on security i on 
day t.  
The average abnormal return (AAR) on day t is 
the mean value of the aggregated abnormal 
returns to all sample firms around the 
announcement date, which is as follows: 
∑
=
= t
N
t
it
t
t ARN
AAR
1
1 .                                         (3) 
The cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) is 
the cumulative mean value of the aggregate of all 
daily abnormal returns in the event window for 
individual security. The CAARs are estimated as: 
∑= 2
1
),( 21
τ
τ
τii ARttCAAR ,                                  (4) 
where CAARi (t1, t2) = cumulative average 
abnormal return for firm i over the entire event 
window (t1, t2) t1 = the first day in the event 
window t2 = number of days in the event window. 
AAR and CAAR are calculated by summing all 
abnormal return for the event window to capture 
the portfolio returns on market response. 
Subsequent to the estimation of CAAR, we examine 
whether the market reaction is significantly different 
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from zero, such that the null hypothesis can be 
rejected. To examine the significant difference 
between the AARs and CAARs, a standard t-test is 
initially conducted1. However, several studies 
(e.g., Amici et al., 2013; and Cummins and 
Weiss, 2004) suggest that there is a variance 
increase in abnormal returns with respect to the 
estimation period surrounding the announcement 
days. This often indicates estimation bias by 
rejecting the null hypothesis; however, in reality, 
the variance effect remains inherent in the 
observed time series. A standard t-test may be 
mis-specified and inefficient in capturing such 
changes in variance. Therefore, we estimated 
difference in means by using the Boehmer et al. 
(1991) test statistic, which is consistent with Amici et 
al. (2013) proposed by Harrington and Shrider 
(2007) and Mentz and Schiereck (2008). We 
calculate a standardization factor SRi, denoted as: 
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Where iˆ εσ  represents the standard deviation of 
abnormal returns, Ts is the number of days within the event window (t1, t2), T is the number of days in the 
estimation period, Rm is the market portfolio returns, 
and 
mR is the average market portfolio returns over 
the estimation period. In accordance with Mentz and 
Schiereck (2008, p. 207), we then determined the Z-
statistic with a t-distribution and T-2 degrees of 
freedom, converging to a unit normal factor. The z-
statistic is represented as: 
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Recently, Kolari and Pynnönen (2010) have proposed 
modified test statistics to examine possible cross-
sectional correlation among abnormal returns by 
incorporating the following factor: 
                                                     
1 The standard t-test infers if the AARs and CARs are significantly 
different from zero. Where,
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where r represents the average of the sample cross 
correlation of the estimated period residuals, and N is 
the number of firms in the sample. 
3. Empirical results 
Table 2 reports the CAARs to acquiring firms in 
China and the UK. The pre-announcement CAARs 
over -1 to -5 event days for both the Chinese and UK 
acquirers are insignificant. The z-statistics suggests 
there is no difference between the Chinese and UK 
acquirers’ excess returns prior to the announcement 
day. The results indicate that the consumer product 
and service industry of both countries responds very 
similarly to M&A, although both markets are 
fundamentally different. The Chinese market tends to 
have a lagged effect in incorporating event-induced 
returns because investors in China are less market-
driven.  
Table 2 reports the CAARs to acquiring firms in 
China and the UK. The pre-announcement CAARs 
over -1 to -5 event days for both the Chinese and UK 
acquirers are insignificant. The z-statistics suggests 
there is no difference between the Chinese and UK 
acquirers’ excess returns prior to the announcement 
day. The results indicate that the consumer product 
and service industry of both countries respond very 
similarly to M&A, although both markets are 
fundamentally different. The Chinese market 
tends to have a lagged effect in incorporating 
event-induced returns because investors in China 
are less market-driven.  
Conversely, we find significant difference between 
the Chinese and UK post-event portfolio returns. 
Both the Chinese and UK acquirers register 
significant excess returns of 0.99% and 0.36%, 
respectively, surrounding the announcement day; 
their reported CAARs are plotted in Figure 1. 
Overall, the post announcement CAARs (days +1 to 
+3) to bidding firms in the UK are positive and 
statistically significant at the 10% level. This result 
is consistent with Andrade et al. (2001); however, 
we register an average 3.65% excess return 
compared with 16% for Andrade et al. (2001). It 
must be noted that our sample is largely different 
from the researchers’ sample. We find that as a 
seasoned M&A market, the information flow is 
more pronounced for the UK acquirers, and the 
market readily responds to the event announcement 
surrounding the event days. Conversely, the 
Chinese market is passing through a transition, in 
which the market response to such events is more 
discreet, particularly for the consumer and product 
service sectors. The Chinese market performance is 
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markedly different from the UK’s because Chinese 
firms behave differently during M&A events. First, 
the equity structure (ownership) of Chinese listed 
companies is distinct and characterized by 
governmental control. The equity of listed companies 
in China consists of state shares, corporate shares and 
tradable shares. According to the Chinese State 
Statistics Bureau, tradable shares represented 51.29% 
of the total stock issue in 2012, and these data were 
34% in 2000. Second, the intervention of the 
Chinese government determines the firms’ M&A 
characteristics, because the large proportion of 
unlisted tradable shares including state shares, 
corporate shares and other non-tradable shares, 
strengthen the government’s intervention ability, 
particularly in the consumer and service industry.
However, intervention by the government also has 
its benefits. Li and Chen (2002) find that 
government intervention can effectively reduce the 
M&A competition and reduce the cost; thus, the 
shareholders of acquiring companies obtain better 
returns in M&A deals. In contrast, Chen and Young 
(2010) observe that the government focuses more 
on the target firms to obtain certain strategic assets 
by engaging in M&A; however, the acquirers 
appear to receive no anticipated gains from the 
M&A. Li and Chen (2002) find that the acquirers 
gain in the Chinese market, whereas bidders do not 
yield any wealth gain, which is not consistent with 
our findings. However, our sample is unique 
because it is composed of consumer product and 
service industry events, which, by its character, is 
different from the findings of the Li and Chen study. 
 
Fig. 1. The cumulative average abnormal returns in China and the UK 
Table 1. The results of CAAR for Chinese and UK firms during the event window (±10 days) 
Event days 
CAAR Z-statistics 
China UK 
Value Sig. 
China UK China UK 
-10 0.3249 0.2873 1.2169 0.9095 0.2338 0.3722 
-9 -0.0221 0.1686 -0.0429 0.4823 0.9661 0.6340 
-8 -0.1134 0.2978 -0.1404 1.0010 0.8893 0.3268 
-7 -0.0102 0.5787 -0.0117 1.2731 0.9908 0.2152 
-6 0.6101 0.1156 0.3698 0.1704 0.7143 0.8661 
-5 0.9050 0.5942 0.9112 0.7517 0.3700 0.4596 
-4 1.2922 0.7963 1.2651 0.9326 0.2163 0.3603 
-3 1.3405 0.9142 1.1365 1.0104 0.2654 0.3224 
-2 1.7968 2.8271 1.3334 1.2614 0.1932 0.2193 
-1 1.6427 1.0807 1.9731 0.8401 0.0584 0.4091 
0 0.9896 0.3583 1.8363 2.0833 0.0770 0.0480 
+1 -0.3634 2.3545 1.7830 2.2184 0.0854 0.0362 
+2 -1.4032 4.5332 2.4623 1.7792 0.0202 0.0879 
+3 -0.6288 4.1762 -0.3365 1.7977 0.7390 0.0848 
+4 -0.4558 2.8417 -0.2493 1.3764 0.8050 0.1814 
+5 -0.0229 2.6497 -0.0119 1.3435 0.9906 0.1917 
+6 -0.1308 2.7309 -0.0631 1.2491 0.9502 0.2237 
+7 -0.5166 3.2414 -0.2454 1.4177 0.8079 0.1691 
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Table 1 (cont.). The results of CAAR for Chinese and UK firms during the event window (±10 days) 
Event days 
CAAR Z-statistics 
China UK 
Value Sig. 
China UK China UK 
+8 0.0778 3.5111 0.0365 1.5142 0.9711 0.1430 
+9 0.1805 3.1840 0.0817 1.4915 0.9355 0.1488 
+10 -0.0569 2.9637 -0.0267 1.3896 0.9789 0.1774 
 
Table 1 reports that the CAARs to acquirers in the UK 
are always higher than Chinese acquirers over post-
announcement (+ 1 to + 10) days. This suggests that 
the event-induced stock performance in the UK 
consumer product and services market is relatively 
more pronounced compared with that of the Chinese 
market. Furthermore, the post event (+ 1 and + 2 days) 
excess returns for the Chinese acquirers are 
significantly negative, i.e., -0.36% and -1.40%, 
respectively. It is also interesting that the Chinese 
acquirers show negative returns between day 3 and 
day 7, although these are statistically insignificant. 
Our findings here indicate that the Chinese acquirers 
may experience immediate wealth loss if an M&A 
event is undertaken in a consumer product and service 
industry; whereas, the UK acquirers significantly gain.  
The reasons why there are insignificant as well as 
negative returns for the Chinese acquirers may well be 
caused by the fact that the investors do not have 
sufficient information regarding the announcement 
because of state intervention, or perhaps investors may 
doubt whether they can benefit from the events if they 
consider a potential investment. Therefore, the 
investors may not be willing to take risks to invest in 
the newly created firms in advance. Another potential 
reason could be that the post-event integration does 
not perform well for the Chinese firms because of 
government intervention. Angwin and Meadows 
(2014) find that the post-acquisition integration phase 
is now widely recognized as a critical part of the 
M&A process and a main source of value creation. 
Moreover, the returns for the event announcement day 
are significantly positive, whereas no subsequent days 
show any significant return continuation; this may 
occur because firms in a single industry have a 
stronger ability for earning profits, which increases the 
confidence of investors to invest in the firms (Spyrou 
and Siougle, 2010). However, Chinese investors may 
misconstrue that, after the M&A events, the industry 
may change.  
We find several plausible reasons behind our results. 
First, the motivation behind the M&A activities is 
complex and could be perceived by Chinese investors 
as trivial in gaining wealth for the shareholders. 
 
Currently, there are particular motivations for M&A in 
China. For example, a large proportion of firms earn 
profits by purchasing at a low price and selling at a 
high price to increase the net worth per share (Zhang, 
2003). These firms’ M&A purposes are not to 
restructure enterprise assets and the industrial bases to 
improve the value of firms. Therefore, the M&A 
market is disordered, and investors lack an 
understanding of the M&A process. In addition, 
because successful M&A cases in China are limited 
and the history is short, the market perception 
regarding M&A tends to be low. Therefore, investors 
do not focus on the long-term returns of the M&A 
activities; instead, they undertake short-term 
investments, focusing on the short-term profits of 
listed companies.  
Conclusions 
This paper examines the portfolio returns of UK and 
Chinese acquirers surrounding an event window of  
± 10 days within the consumer product and services 
industries. The sample consists of 29 Chinese and 25 
UK acquirers engaged in M&A deals during 2012. 
Our results suggest that the Chinese acquirers do not 
receive any event induced gain subsequent to M&A 
with the exception of the announcement day. In 
addition, these deals yield insignificant negative 
excess returns for approximately a week. Conversely, 
the UK acquirers register a significant positive return 
through + 3 days of the announcement. The event 
announcement is perceived as significant for the 
Chinese market; however, in contrast to the UK 
market, the continuation of gains to acquirers does not 
transpire. The Chinese consumer product and services 
sector appears to lack the information flow that 
motivates investors to consider investing in the 
merged firms. Although the government has 
introduced wider market reforms, it still appears that 
the Chinese market does not yet utilize its benefits and 
is yet to exit the state-owned enterprise system. 
Moreover, this behavior shows that, despite an upward 
trend in the Chinese consumer product and services 
industry, the sector is clearly suffering from 
information asymmetry and a lack of investor 
confidence.  
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